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Cert to Ct. of Customs and Patent 
No. 77-539 1\pps. (Markey; Hiller and Baldi·Jin 
dysenti.~ ~ 
ZENITH RADIO CORP. ~ ~ # /u,.., • ...._ k_,_>. 
v. · ~~~ 
UNITED STATES ~~~ ~ ~ ~ely 
1. SUMMARY: 19 U.S.C~(S~ . ha t 
whenever a country bestows di~o  ~nt~ol': 
~·t-t..,f. k-~ 
grant upon the export of any article manufactur~-~ that c~~try 
the United States shall levy an import duty equal to the net amout 
of such bounty or grant in addition to any duties otherwise imposed 
on that article. The issues presented here are (1) whether the 
* Copy attached 
f 
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remission of a commodity tax on products exported constitute s the 
bestowal of a bounty or grant for purposes of §1303 and {2) whethe r 
the Ct. of Customs and Patent Apps. (CCPA) prope rly ente r e d sun~ary 
judgment for the govt, in this suit on the assumption that the 
Sec. of the Treasury made a detenltination that the forgiveness of 
the tax does not con f er a b e nefit counterva~lable under §1303? 
2. FACTS: vjapan' s Commodity Tax Law imposes a single-stage 
consumption tax usually at the manufacturing leve l on certain 
consumer goods, including electronic products like those manufacture d 
by Zenith. The rates range from 5 to 40 per cent. Upon exportation 
of these products from Japan, the tax is either r e mitted, i f 
·----previously paid, or the products are e x empted from the tax . 
Zenith, a domestic manufacturer of consumer electronic products , 
filed a petition with the Commissioner of Customs under §1303 
seeking the assessme nt of countervailing du t ies on consume r 
electronic products from Japan because Japan exempts thos e p r oduc ts 
from its commodity tax when they are e xported. Six years late r 
the Treasury Dept. d e t e rmine d that no bounty or grant was being 
paid or bestowed, directly or indirectly within the meaning of 
§1303. 
Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. §1516 (d) (Supp. V. 1975) Zenith filed 
suit in the Customs Court challenging the Sec. of the Treasury's 
determination. The court granted Zenith's motion for summary 
judgment. It. unanimously held, in an opinion by Richardson J. , 
that the forgiveness of the Japanese Co~~dity tax- constitute s the 
conferral of a bounty or grant under 1303, as a matter of law, 
and ordered the Sec. of the Treasury to determine the net amounts 
of the bounty or grant bestowed and to assess countervailing duties 
- j -
equal to those amounts. The court based its decision on Downs v. 
United States, 187 U.S. 496 (1903) where ·the Court held that an 
elaborate scheme of the Russian govt. was an indirect bounty 
under the 1897 Tariff Act, the predecessor of §1303· Under the 
Russian scheme, exporters of sugar were relieved of the ordinary 
excise tax on sugar sold domestically. They also received 
marketable certificates of value upon exporting sugar. The 
certificates could be sold to other sugar producers who would then 
be free to have their surplus sugar reclassified as free sugar 
and sold on the domestic market without the tax burden that would 
otherwise accompany the sale of surplus sugar. 
In granting Zenith •s motion for summary judgment the Court 
quoted the following portion of Downs. 
The details of this elaborate procedure for the 
production, sale, taxation, and exportation of 
Russian sugar are of much less importance than the 
two facts which appear clearly through this maze 
of regulations, viz .: that no sugar is permitted 
to be sold in Russia that does not pay an excise 
tax of R. 1.75 per pood and that sugar exported 
pays no tax at all . 
. . When a tax is imposed upon all sugar produced , 
but is remitted upon all sugar exported, then, by 
whatever process, or in whatever manner, or under 
whatever name, it is jisquised , it is a bounty upon 
exportation. Id. at 515. 
The court rejected the govt. •s argument ~hat the above language 
was only dictum. As an indica~ion of the precedential value of 
the language, it noted that the Board of Generul ~ppraisers soon 
cited Downs for the proposition that tax remission upon exportation 
constituted the conferral of a bounty under the 1897 Act and 
that the Notes of Tariff Revision prepared by the assistant 
c~ counsel to the Treasury Dept. for ~he use of the House Committee 
( 
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on Ways and Means in 1908 cited Downs for the same proposition. 
It said that Congress' reenactment of the language of the 1897 
act was a classical example of ratification of the judicial 
construction put upon that language. It rejected the govt. 's 
the 
argument chat _Downs had misinterpreted I intent of Congress as 
shown by Congressional debates for two reasons. It said that 
the statute's language was so plain that there was no need to 
resort to congYessional debates and that even if the debates 
were considered they would not have required a different result. 
The court also rejected the govt. 's argument that the General 
Agreement of Ta riffs and Trade (GATT) and legislation other than 
the Tariff Act required the conclusion that the remission of 
the commodity tax not give rise to a countervailing tariff. 
The court pointed out that international commitments such as 
GATT cannot supersede acts of Congress and that the United States 
entered the pertinent part of GATT to the fullest extent not 
inconsistent with existing legislation. Finally the court rejected 
the govt. 's argument that the remission of the commodity tax 
was not so excessive as to :require a count.ervailing tariff under 
a long standing administrative interpretation of §1303. It said 
that the administrative interpretation was in conflict with Downs 
and must yield. Judges Newman and Boe joined in the opinion but 
concurred to elaborate on the points made in the court's opinion. 
The ca6'rt of of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) reversed 
and remanded with directions to enter summary judgn1ent for the 
govt. It rejected the lower court's interpretation of Downs. 
~ 
I 
/--- v - :J -
The CCPA held that the language in Downs stating that the remission ? 
of an excise tax is a bounty was only dictum. It insisted that 
the holding in ~owns was based on the conjunctive effect of the 
remission of excise taxes and the further issuance of a marketable 
certifiate on the export of sugar. The court then turned to the 
language of §1303. In the court's view the words "bounty" and 
"grant" were broad but not ambiguous. It said that the "net -------... 
amount" of the bounty means the true boun·ty or grant actually 
conferred as an economic benefit. Although the record was silent 
regarding the economic result of the Japanese comnodity tax, the 
court assumed that the Sec. had determined that the economic result 
was not the conferring of a benefit that rose to the level of a 
bounty or grant under §1303. It asserted that nothing in the 
language or legislative history of §1303 aided it in determining 
whether the remission of an excise tax on exports required a 
countervailing tariff. It rejected the lower court's conclusion 
that Congress has ratified the language of Down~ by maintaining 
the language of the act in subsequent statutes. It noted the 
Treasury Dept.'s longstanding interpretation of §1303 requiring 
that there be a remission in excess of the excise tax due in order 
to require a countervailing tariff. And it gave the Treasury Dept.'s 
interpretation great weight since the contradictory language in 
(CCPA' s) 
Downs was, in the/opinion, only dictum. Although it noted that 
Congress has refused to follow suggestions that it enact the 
Treasury's practice, the court found it difficult to believe that 
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CCPA 
~ekaid that the Treasury's longstand~ng interpretation 
must stand as a permissible interpretation of §1303 until lawfully 
changed and held that the Treasury had not erred in its conclusion 
that the Japanese Commodity Tax is .a non-excessive remission of 
an excise tax which fails to constitute a bounty or grant under 
the statute. It ordered· the lower court to enter sun~ary judgment 
for the govt. 
Judge Miller wrote a dissenting opinion which Judge 
Baldwin joined. He insisted 
was not dictum but that th 
scheme included two bou.ntie 
and the provision of valuable 
the disputed language of Downs 
had found that the Russian 
of the excise tax 
r:r-,.,.... ......... -.7 He said that the 
finding of either bounty supported the result in that case and 
that both findings were of equal validity. As further support 
for his interpretation of Downs he noted that the disputed 
portion of Downs had been recognized as an example of an indirect 
bounty in Nicholas & Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 34, 41 (191 9 ) 
Judge Miller rejected the Treasury's longstanding interpretation 
of §1303 as inconsistent with judicial interpretation. He also 
examined the legislative history of the Tariff Act's revisions 
since Downs and concluded that "Congress has ·not acquiesced in 
the administrative practice of failing to recognize the ordinary 
remission of e xcise taxes as a bounty or grant for purposes of 
section [1303] much less repudiated, or given any signal of its 
disfavor with, the interpretation of the key language in section 
,, 
[1303] by the Supreme Court. 
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( 3. CONTENTIONS; (1) Zenith argues that the disputed portion 
of Downs was not dictum and that the decision below is in conflict 
with Downs. As support for its position it repeats the argument 
of the dissent and the Court of Customs. It notes that Congress 
responded to complaints about thv Treasury's refusal to levy the 
requested countervailing tariff by providing for the first time 
in 1975 that American manufacturers can obtain judicial review 
of decisions not to impose countervailing tariffs. [This case 
is the first case brought to the CCPA under that right of judicial 
review]. 
In response the SG says that Downs did not decide whether 
a non-excessive remission of a tax, standing alone, constitutes 
a bounty or grant under the statute and argues that the legislative 
history of the Tariff Act both before and after Downs as well as 
Congress' acquiescence in the Treasury's longstanding interpretation 
of the statute supports the holding below. He contends that the 
countervailing duty assessed in Downs did not in fact include the 
amount of the excise tax remission but was based upon the value 
of the marketable certificates. In response to that contention 
Zenith notes that the amount of the countervailing duty assessed 
in Downs was clearly not in issue. 
The SG also points out that existing trade agreements, 
including GATT, to which the U.S. is a party1 adopt ·the principle 
that countervailing duties shall not be assessed in response to 
the remission of excise taxes on exports. He warns that adoption 
of Zenith's construction of §1303 would undermine the flexibility 
of the United States' position in upcoming negotiations under the 
(. 
- ~ -
GATT, risk a significant breakdown in international trading 
agreements, and invite retaliatory actions. He insists that 
as long as there is a possibility that the CCPA may be reverse d, 
there will be considerable uncertainty in the United States' 
position and negotiating options. 
\ 
United States Stee l and Bethlehem Steel have filed amicus 
briefs in support of Zenith. They make the same basic arguments 
and also urge the Ct. of Cust. and Patent Apps's decision to defer 
to the Treasury Dept. has subverted the Congressiona l intent to 
provide meaningful judicial review of the Treasury's determination 
to domestic manufacturers. U.S. Steel is currently litigating 
the same issue regarding the remission of the value added 
tax on exported steel by six European countries. The Committee 
to Preserve American Color Television (CAMP) has also filed an 
amicus bri e f in support of Zenith. It emphasizes the importa nce 
of this case to the dome stic consumer electronics i ndustry . 
(2) Zenith says that the CCPA should have rema nde d the 
case for furth e r evidence since it suggested that the economic 
result of the tax remission was important and did not decide that 
remission of an excise tax is not a bounty as a matter of law. 
This argument see ms to be based on the CCPA's statement that 
it is the eco11omic result of the foreign govt.'s action which 
on the CCPA's 
controls and kssumptio11 that the Sec. had determined tha t the 
economic result here is not the conferring of such a benefit 
as would rise to the level of a bounty or grant. 
The SG replies that there was no need to remand because 
there was no factual dispute about the economic result of the 
remission . The only issue, according to the SG, was whether as 
- :::1 -
a matter of law, the remission of taxes upon export is a grant 
or bounty giving rise to an obligation tro impose a countervailing 
duty. 
4. DISCUSSION: There is nothing certworthy anout the 
second issue. The CCPA's opinion is not entirely clear but, 
CCPA 
contrary to what Zenith says,the/seems 'to have accepted the 
Treasury's interpretation as a permissible one as a matter of 
law. Since the Treasury has decided that the remission of an 
excise tax on exports alone does not require a countervailing 
tariff, there seems no need for further fact finding. 
The first issue probably requires the Court's attention. 
Congress has apparently acquiesced in both the language of Downs 
and the Treasury's policy of not imposing a countervailing tariff 
against the remission of an excise tax. The legislative history, 
as far as it is contained in the briefs, seems inconclusive. The 
real question is whether the crucial language in Downs is dictum 
and, if not, whether it should be overruled. Although it is 
possible to interprete Downs as holding only that the issuance 
of a valuable certificate upon the export of sugar in addition 
to remission of excise taxes is a bounty, the more accurate 
interpretation seems to be that of the Customs Court. Despite 
the SG's argument that granting cert would create uncertainty 
in the govt. 's trade negotiations, Congress has clearly placed 
the issue in the courts by providing judicial review for Zenith's 
complaint and refusing to settle the issue by amending the statute. 
Congress is free to amend the statute if it dislikes the 





Pa.rr opns in petn. 
It is very difficult to read the statements in the Downs 
case upon which • Zenith relies as dicta, as the court below 
tried to do. The Downs Court made the same point over and 
over: 
"A bounty may be direct, as where a certain amount is 
paid upon the production or exportation of particular 
articles ••• or indirect, by the remission of taxes upon 
the exportation of articles which are s~ected to a tax 
when sold or consumed in the country of their production, 
of which our laws, permitting distillers of spirits to 
export the same without payment of an internal revenue 
tax or other burden, is an example." 187 U.S., at 502. 
"[I]£ a preference be given to merchandise exported over 
that sold in the home market, by the remission of an excise 
tax, the effect would be the same as if all such merchandise 
were taxed, and a drawback repaid to the manufacturer upon so 
much as he exported ••• o [WJhere ••o these regulations exempt 
sugar exported from excise taxation altogether, we think it 
clearly falls within the definition of an indirect bounty 
upon exportation." Id., at 513. 
"When a tax is imposed upon all sugar produced, but is remitted 
upon all sugar exported, then, by whatever process, or in 
whatever manner, or under whatever name it is disguised, it 
is a bounty upon exportation." Id., at 515 • 
V Downso It may be that the case s ou d e overru e , ut o not 
• ~/ In short, I think it is very likel tat the court below misread 
think the Court should allow a lower court to make that decision. 
%kexEaxe This case appears to be of eneral imno~~ce, given the 
amicus support for a grant. I woul vote o grant. 
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Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States 
Under the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by the 
Trade Act of 1974, 19 u.s.c. § 1303, the Secretary of the 
Treasury must offset any foreign subsidization of exports 
,_, - -- --._. with an import duty eg~l to the net amount of the 
~- ._.. aws 
subsidy. 19 U.S.C. § 1303. The investigation leading to 
such a determination may be initiated either by the 
government or by a private party. Ibid. The 
responsibility to impose a countervailing duty is limited 
only by exceptions defined in the statute. For example, 
if the imported good is duty free, a countervailing duty 
may be imposed only upon a showing of domestic injury. 
2. 
The issue presented here is whether, under the 
Act, the Japanese Commodity Tax Law bestows ~ ':Eount_y@ 
2.5an~" within the terms of the Trade Act, 19 u.s.c. § 3-+'-~•~ 
1303. The Japanese law imposes an internal tax upon J -~ ~ 
manufacturer's shipments of certain electronic products~~~ 
~I'M-
destined for consumption in Japan, with rates varying fro~ 1 --~~~ 
...&U4r~ 
5 to 20 percent. When such goods are destined for export,~ 
however, the tax is ~a ted o::._ ~o:_ coll,;.cted. Zenith 1:'~ 
alleged that such remissions amount to a "grant or bounty" ~
on exports and requested the imposition of a 
countervailing duty to offset it. 
In January 1976, the Acting Commissioner of 
Customs, after a six-year delay, announced that remission 
of the Japanese Commodity Tax was not a "bounty or grant" 
and refused to impose a countervailing duty. Pursuant to 
§ 32l(f) (1) of the Act, Zenith contested this 
determination in the Customs Court. That court 
unanimously held that remission of the Commodity Tax was 
bounty or grant as a matter of law and granted summary 
judgment for Zenith. 430 F. Supp. 242 (Cust. Ct. 1977). 
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reversed, 3-2. 
562 F.2d 1209 (C.C.P.A. 1977). 
The case revolves around two principal issues: 
(i) the proper interpretation of an old case dealing with 
3. 
the "bounty or grant" language in a predecessor statute, 
Downs v. United States, 187 U.S. 496 (1903); and (ii) 
whether as a matter of "economic reality" the mere 
remission of an indirect tax can amount to a subsidy. 
resolve both in Zenith's favor and reverse. As a matter 
-------------~---------------------~-----d of foreign policy, the C.C.P.A. result might be desirable, 
but under the statute and the Downs case, it is difficult, 
to reach. 
I 
THE MEANING OF DOWNS 
Zenith insists that mere remission of an indirect 
tax is a "bounty or grant" within the meaning of the 
statute. The Treasury takes the position -- and 
apparently has done so for 80 years -- that noncollection 
of an indirect tax is fundamentally neutral; a bounty or 
grant is made only if the remission is "excessive," that 
is, if an amount is remitted over and above the amount of 
the tax. The primary battleground in this dispute is 
Downs v. United States, 187 u.s. 496 (1903), which 
involved an elaborate Russian program for controlling 
sugar production and prices. 
The Russian government placed all sugar into 
4 . 
three categories: (i) "free sugar," which could be sold 
domestically subject to a standard 1.75 ruble excise tax; 
(ii) "indivertible reserve," which had to be held by the 
manufacturer in case greater quantities were needed to 
prevent domestic prices from exceeding a predetermined 
ceiling; and (iii) "free surplus," which was all sugar 
left after specifying the amounts in the first two 
categories. Free surplus could not be sold domestically 
except upon the payment of a prohibitive double excise of 
3.50 rubles. If free surplus was exported, however, the 
producer received both a remission of the normal excise 
tax and a certificate he could negotiate to other 
producers allowing the transfer from the free surplus 
category (which could be sold domestically only at the 
prohibitive double excise) to the free sugar category 
(which could be sold domestically at the standard excise) 
of an amount of sugar equal to the amount exported. The 
Court described the results of this arrangement: 
" By this arrangement neither the total amount fJ~ -~ ~ 
of free sugar allowed to the two manufacturers ~
nor the total export has been increased, since 
what the assignor [of the certificate] exports 
the assignee sells as free sugar. The assignee, 
however, has secured the large profits of the 
sale of his sugar at horne and saved his freight 
to the coast, while on the other hand the seaport 
merchant has sacrificed those profits by 
exporting sugar at a less remunerative price. It 
follows that the price received for his export 
5 • 
certificate is the difference between what he 
would have received had he sold his free sugar at 
home and the price he would have obtained on the 
foreign market." 187 U.S., at 512. 
Although the Court did not discuss the actual 
prices obtained for the certificates, a Treasury document 
submitted to the Court explained that the minimum price 
was 1 ruble. App. 49-51. By some undisclosed process of 
reasoning, this fact led the Secretary to impose a 
countervailing duty of .50 ruble, on the theory that a 
minimum price of 1 ruble permitted export of sugar at a 
price .50 ruble below cost of production but the earning 
of .50 ruble profit. This value alone was 
"countervailed": although the Court does not mention it, 
the remitted 1.75 excise tax was not included in the 
countervailing duty. 
The Court upheld the Secretary's imposition of 
the countervailing duty, holding that the Russian scheme 
amounted to a "bounty or grant" under the statute. The 
customs Court seized repeated phrases in the Downs 
opinion, such as the following, and concluded that mere 
remission of a tax is a bounty or grant: 
"The details of this elaborate procedure for the 
production, sale, taxation, and exportation of 
Russian sugar are much less important than the 
two facts which appear clearly through this maze 
of regulations, viz.: that no sugar is permitted 
6. 
to be sold in Russia that does not pay an excise 
tax of R. 1.75 per pood [about 36 pounds], and 
that sugar exported pays no excise tax at all. 
The mere imposition of an import duty of three 
roubles per pood, paid upon foreign sugar, is, 
like all protective duties, a bounty, but a 
bounty on production, and not upon exportation. 
When a tax is imposed on all sugar produced, but 
is remitted upon all sugar exported, then, by_ 
whatever process, or in whatever manner, or under 
whatever name it is disguised, it is a bounty 
upon exportation." Id., at 515 (emphasis added}. 
C.C.P.A. dismissed this language and similar 
statements in the Downs opinion as dicta. Judge Markey 
argued that in other portions of the decision, the Court 
refers to the certificate procedure and the scheme as a 
whole, rather than to the remission of the tax, as the 
bounty. Moreover, the actual countervailing duty that the 
Court upheld did not embrace the value of the excise tax 
remitted upon export, but was limited to the net value of 
the certificate. Thus, said C.C.P.A., the actual holding 
of Downs was limited to an excessive remission of an 
excise tax -- the bounty was the boost that the 
cerfificates gave the exporter over and above the 
remission of the standard excise. Petn 63a, 65a. In 
Judge Markey's view, Downs' holding mandates the 
Treasury's position that remission of an indirect tax is a 
bounty or grant only when it is excessive. This is also 
the view of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 61 
7 . 
Stat. A63, to which the United States is a party, and 
which C.C.P.A. seemed quite anxious to prevent the U.S. 
from violating. 
As an exercise in the reading of cases, Judge 
Markey's opinion is not completely persuasive. In 
describing as a bounty the "remission of taxes upon the 
exportation of articles which are subjected to a tax when 
sold or consumed in the country of their production," 187 
U.S., at 502, the Downs Court cited United States v. 
Passavant, 169 u.s. 16 (1898). In that case, the German 
government imposed a duty upon merchandise sold in the 
domestic market, which was collected when the finished 
product went into the consumer market. Since the tax was 
collected upon sale, the price reflected the tax. Upon 
exportation of the product, however, the tax was not 
imposed or its payment rebated. The Court nevertheless 
held that the amount of the tax was to be considered in 
determining the dutiable value of German goods imported 
into the United States: 
"[The remission of the tax] is a special 
advantage extended by the government in aid of 
manufacturers and trade, having the same effect 
as a bonus or drawback. To use one of the 
definitions of drawback, it is 'a device resorted 
to for enabling a commodity affected by taxes to 
be exported and sold in the foreign market on the 
same terms as if it had not been taxed at all.'" 
169 u.s., at 23. 
8. 
Citation of Passavant, then, certainly supports the idea 
that the Downs Court viewed remission of a tax, in itself, 
as a bounty on exports. In addition, the Court cited the 
report of a conference in Brussels on the question of 
sugar duties. That report described as bounties, inter 
alia, "'the total or partial exemptions from taxation 
granted to a portion of the manufactured products." 187 
u.s., at 502. 
Also, contrary to the suggestion in the SG's 
Brief at 33 & n.25, the Treasury's brief in Downs did 
appear to argue that the mere remission of a tax would 
consititute a bounty: " •.• [A]ny special favor, 
benefit, advantage, or inducement conferred by the 
government, even if it is not a direct charge upon the 
I 
Treasury, is fairly included in the idea and meaning of an 
indirect bounty." Petn lOOa n. 15. 
Also, the Qowns Court appeared to make the 
determination that the certificates were a bounty on 
exports turn on the existence of the remission of the tax: 
" ... [I]f a preference be given to merchandise 
exported over that sold in the home market, by 
the remission of an excise tax, the effect would 
be the same as if all such merchandise were 
taxed, and a drawback repaid to the manufacturer 
upon so much as he exported. If the additional 
bounty [i.e., the certificates] paid by Russia 
upon exported sugar were the result of a high 
protective tariff upon foreign sugar, and a 
9 • 
further enhancement of prices by a limitation of 
the amount of free sugar put upon the market, we 
should regard the effect of such regulations as 
being simply a bounty upon production, although 
it might incidentally and remotely foster an 
increased exportation of sugar; but where in 
addition to that these regulations exempt sugar 
exported from excise taxation altoghether, we 
think it clearly falls within the definition of 
an indirect bounty upon exportation." 187 U.S., 
at 513. 
Thus, the Court's view that the certificate amounted to an 
additional bounty on exportation was dependent upon the 
prior finding that remission of the tax was also such a 
bounty. 
As to the fact that the actual countervailing 
duty before the Court related only to the value of the 
certificates and did not include the amount of the excise 
remitted, that was not the Court's fault. It was the 
Treasury that set the amount of the duty, and the amount 
was not before the Court. Only the legal issue as to the 
existence of a bounty, not the factual determination as to 
its amount, was presented, and the Court resolved that 
legal issue in a manner that clearly seems to have 
involved a conclusion that remission of an excise tax upon 
exportation is a bounty. 
This view is supported by G.S. Nicholas & Co. v. 
United States, 249 U.S. 34 (1919). The controversy in 
Nicholas involved a British statute that subjected all 
potable spirits distilled and sold in the United Kingdom 
10. 
to a tax of 14s. 9d. per gallon. Exporters were not only 
exempted from the tax, but were paid an allowance from the 
treasury of 3d. per gallon of pure spirits and 5d. per 
gallon of compounded spirits. The Treasury Department 
again countervailed only against the extra allowance, not 
against the amount of the excise tax remitted. 
Nevertheless, the Nicholas Court cited the broad language 
of Downs as the holding of that case and added some broad 
language of its own: 
"[T]he sale of spirits to other countries is 
relieved from a burden that their sale in the 
United Kingdom must bear. There is a benefit, 
therefore, in exportation, an inducement to seek 
the foreign market." 249 U.S., at 37. 
The only recent case to deal with this issue is 
American Express Co. v. United States, 332 F. Supp. 191 
(Cust. Ct. 1971), aff'd, 472 F.2d 1050 (C.C.P.A. 1~73). 
Italy remitted the full amount of various indirect taxes 
upon the exportation of electronic transmission tower 
components. Previously, the same taxes had been cast in 
the form of a direct tax on the manufacturer's overhead. 
Hence, in countervailing against the full amount of the 
indirect taxes, the Treasury may have been motivated by 
the fact that the taxes strongly resembled the direct tax 
they had replaced. Specifically, there was a lack of 
relationship between the value of the goods and the amount 
11. 
of the taxes remitted that suggested that the taxes were 
direct. The Treasury treated the taxes according to this 
underlying nature, rather than their illusory form as 
indirect taxes. (Direct taxes are countervailable under 
GATT; indirect taxes are not.) The Customs Court upheld 
the imposition of the countervailing duty, concluding that 
the broad language in Down~ about remission of indirect 
taxes was the holding of the Court. C.C.P.A. affirmed 
without reaching the Downs issue. Instead, it analyzed 
the nature of the taxes at issue and agreed with the 
Treasury that they really were direct. 
II 
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
The operative language of the statute has ~-t~~ 
~··~I ; remained virtually unchanged since 1897. C.C.P.A. 
reasoned that since Congress repeatedly has re-enacted the 
statute without change, it must approve of the consistent 
administrative practice under it. The court cited two 
documents, submitted to Congress, interpreting Downs as 
being based on the excessive remission notion (via the 
certificates). Petn 72a-73a. One was a submission to the 
House Ways and Means Committee, the other a report of the 
Tariff Commission. 
12. 
The usual presumption that arises from continual 
statutory re-enactment in the face of a supposedly 
controlling decision of this Court, however, is that the 
decision itself controls, not the gloss put upon it by 
some bureaucrat, upon which Congress does not even purport 
to take any action. (But cf. United States Steel v. 
Multistate Tax Commission,--- U.S.---,--- (White, J., 
dissenting).) Thus, this line of analysis simply takes us J 
back to interpretation of what the Downs opinion meant. 
Another factor cutting against the narrow 
interpretation of C.C.P.A. is that the 1897 Act was a 
deliberate expansion of its predecessors. The Tariff Act 
of 1894 provided for payment of an additional duty on 
sugar, syrups, and molasses where the exporting country 
paid a bounty on exportation. The 1890 Tariff Act had a 
similar provision applying only to sugar. Apparently, 
these sections were intended to apply only to excessive 
remissions-- i.e., in excess of the amount of the tax 
but in 1897, different language was used, particularly the 
addition of the broader word "grant" to supplement 
"bounty." The Nicholas Court adopted this view of the 
1897 Act as broadening the statute from excessive 
remissions to all remissions. 249 U.S., at 39. I think 
the SG's argument to the contrary is simply misleading. 
13. 
Finally, in 1951 and 1952, the Treasury sought 
amendments that would make the statute conform to the 
administrative practice of countervailing only against 
excessive remissions. These proposals were rejected. 
C.C.P.A. argued that the rejection did not stem from 
congressional disapproval of the administrative practice, 
but from objections to other parts of the proposals. Petn 
78a. Furthermore, Congress did not adopt the suggestion 
of some witnesses on the Trade Act of 1974 explicitly to 
make nonexcess i ve excise remissions countervailable. The 
only inference from all of this is that Congress seems to 
c- ------------------------- ~· 
be satisfied with whatever the Act says. And what it says ~~~ 
seems to be what Downs says. In short, the legislative 
history is not very helpful. 
III 
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
Apparently realizing that his position on both 






the SG relies quite heavily on a sort of economic analysis 
of the effects of indirect taxes, such as the Japanese 
Commodity Tax. He attempts to show that failure to 
collect such taxes does not amount to a subsidization of 
exports, since the product goes off to the foreign land to 
14. 
compete at its "actual" cost of production, not at a level 
below costs of production, as was the case in Downs and 
Nicholas. 
This argument, however, assumes the conclusion: 
that such taxes are not genuine costs of production, the 
forgiveness of which amounts to a form of subsidy. In 
other words, the SG takes issue with the language in Downs 
and Nicholas to the effect that if exports are excused 
from a tax that all products are asked to pay, there is an 
inducement to seek the foreign market and consequently, a 
subsidy in favor of exports. 
The underlying premise of the Treasury's position 
-- and GATT'S -- that remissions of direct taxes are 
subsidies but remissions of indirect taxes are not, is the 
notion that direct taxes are not passed through to the 
purchaser but are partially absorbed and partially shifted 
backwards to factors of production in the form of lower 
wages and lower prices for raw materials; indirect taxes, 
on the other hand are supposed to be passed completely 
forward to the purchaser, so that forgiveness of a tax 
does not reflect foregiveness of any cost that the 
manufacturer would bear in any event. Hence, there is no 
subsidy. 
This premise is now widely regarded as untrue by 
15. 
ecQQomists. "A review of American economists would 
probably now indicate general acceptance of partial 
forward shifting of the corporate income tax as well as 
some backward shifting of the excise tax. The extremes of 
full shifting in either direction are for the most part 
rejected." 114 Cong. Rec. 3660 (1968) (extension of 
remarks of Rep. Curtis, quoting Milton Leontiades). See 
M. Kryzniak & R. Musgrave, The Incidence of the 
Corporation Income Tax, chs. 6, 8 (1963). Even the 
Treasury appears to accept this as an economic truth, App. 
80, but adheres to its policy on the statute out of fear 
of the repercussions that might follow a violation of 
GATT. (Note that the Treasury is not bound to follow 
GATT, since a protocol requires the United States to 
adhere to the provision about countervailing duties only 
to the extent permitted by the law in existence in 1947. 
61 Stat. A2051. Hence, if the statute requires 
countervailing duties on remissions of indirect taxes, the 
Treasury would be bound by law to countervail, rather than 
to follow GATT.) 
Where an indirect tax is not fully shifted 
forward into the price, a remission of the portion of the 
tax not shifted permits the producer to offset some of his 
costs. Hence, there is a subsidy to the extent of the tax 
16. 
not shifted forward, creating a competitive advantage. 
Moreover, it might be possible to look at the 
excise tax in the simpler terms of the Downs and Nicholas 
Courts. Any time there is a forgiveness of a burden all 
products are asked to bear at horne, there is a subsidy in 
the amount of the "societal cost" that manufacturers 
generally are asked to pay. This induces the manufacturer 
to seek the foreign market, where he is free of the 
responsibility for recognizing the social costs of his 
activities at horne police and fire protection, 
pollution, employment insurance, etc. -- that were covered 
by the tax revenues forgiven. Thus, in a sense it may be 
said that he is selling in the foreign market below his 
true costs of production. 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of Congress does not emerge clearly, 
but the application of the normal presumption would tell 
us that constant re-enactment in the face of Downs means 
that Congress accepted whatever that decision stands for. 
As indicated above, it seems to stand for the proposition 
that nonexcessive remission of an indirect tax, like the 
one at issue here, is a countervailable bounty or grant. 
17. 
Inconsistent administrative practice cannot override that 
interpretation, particularly since for the first 76 years 
of practice under the Act there was no judicial review of 
decisions not to impose a countervailing duty. See United 
States v. Hammond Lead Products, Inc., 440 F.2d 1024 
(C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 404 u.s. 1005 (1971) (finding no 
jurisdiction to review negative countervailing duty 
determination), overruled by 19 U.S.C. § 1516(d). Hence, 
there was no effective way to challenge the Treasury 
practice. 
Modern economic analysis indicates that the Downs 
Court was correct in viewing such remissions as 
subsidies. Thus, in the absence of any clear directive 
from Congress, the better course would seem to be to 
adhere to precedent as supported by economic policy. If 
Congress wishes to define "bounty or grant" more precisely 
either to fit GATT or to permit more detailed analysis 
by the Secretary of the actual economic effects of 
particular taxes, both direct and indirect then it may 
do so. 
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WASHINGTON REPORT 
Supreme Court Ponders a Time Bomb 
By CLYDE H. FARNSWORTH 
WASHINGTON - In Japan they 
speak ·of the Zenith case as the "jigan 
bakudan" of trade, in Germany as "die 
Bombe mit Zeitziindung," in France as 
"une bombe a ret:!. dement." 
In plain English, these epithets trans-
late as a "trade time bomb," not an ex-
aggerated description of an issue on 
which the Supreme Court will announce 
a decision at any moment. Trade ex-
perts in the United States as well as 
abroad compare the potential impact of 
a ruling In favor of the Zenith Radio Cor-
poration to what occurred after enact-
ment of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 
1930, the protectionist legislation that 
many historians believe ushered in the 
Great Depression. 
The Court will determine whether ex-
porters of goods to the United States are 
getting an unfair advantage when they 
receive a certain type of tax rebate from 
their governments. The arguments: 
• Zenith says that the rebate consti-
tutes a "bounty or grant" - a subsidy 
that under countervailing-duty legisla-
tion should automatically trigger pro-
tective levies by the United States to 
erase the competitive advantage. 
• The Treasury says that the rebate, 
under the Government's practice of the 
last 80 years, is not an express subsidy 
and that if countervailing duties were 
applied foreign governments would re-
taliate against the United States, result-
ing in massive trade disruption. 
"We are watching this case like milk 
on a hot· stove," an official of Europe's 
Common Market said. "An adverse rul-
Ing could bring <:haos." 
Japanese officials see Zenith's posi-
tion and similar allegations by the 
United States Steel Corporation as part 
of a protectionist ferment that threatens 
economic and political stability in the 
world. "It's. a cloud over the multilat-
eral trade negotiations," warns Alonzo 
McDonald, this country's deputy trade 
In the Zenith case, the Court will decide 
whether a tax rebate given to foreign . 
companies selling in the U.S. is unfair '· 
to U.S. producers. A ruling in favor of 
Zenith could turn world trade topsy-turvy. 
low. Right after the Customs Court 
ruled in favor of Zenith last year, U.S. 
Steel echoed Zenith's argument by ask-
ing for countervailing duties on steel 
from Western Europe. There the value 
added tax, an indirect tax borne by con-
sumers throughout the Common Mar-
ket, Is rebated on exports. If Japanese 
electronics companies are getting a 
"bounty or grant," U.S. Steel insisted, 
so are European steel mills. 
The permutations and combinations 
are endless and, for American compa-
nies, could cut both ways. In March the 
Ford Motor Co.mpany filed a friend-of-
the-court brief in the Zenith case, asking 
the Supreme Court to narrow the focus 
of its ruling. Ford lmports .automobiles 
and parts from Its factories abroad and 
is afraid that a blanket levying of coun-
tervailing duties would raise its costs. 
But Ford suggested that it would not 
mind higher duties on cars built over-
seas by foreign-owned companies. · 
Zenith is relying heavily on a Supreme 
Court decision of 1903. In that case a 
Baltimore importer, Robert E. Downs, 
contested the imposition of a counter-
vailing duty on sugar from Russia. The 
Czarist Government relieved the ex-
porters of 'the excise tax they would 
have owed if the sugar had been sold at 
home in Russia . . 
In its decision, the Supreme Court 
said: "When a tax is imposed upon all 
sugar produced but is remitted upon all 
sugar exported, then, by whatever 
process or in whatever manner or under 
whatever name it is disguised, it Is a 
bounty upon exportation." So the sugar 
duty remained in force. 
This passage sounds as if the Issue had 
already been settled. But the Treasury 
contends that the passage cannot be 
lifted from its context. 
The thrust of the ·Treasury's legal ar-
gument is that the United States in 1903 
was imposing a countervailing duty only 
on the amount of excessive tax remis-
sion - on what" was identifiable as a 
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many historians believe ushered in the 
Great Depression. 
The Court will determine whether ex-
porterS of goods to the United States are 
getting an unfair advantage when they 
receive a certain type of tax rebate from 
their governments. The arguments: 
• Zenith says that the rebate consti-
tutes a "bounty or grant" - a subsidy 
that under countervailing-duty legisla-
tion should automatically trigger pro-
tective levies by the United States to 
erase the competitive advantage. 
• The Treasury says that the rebate, 
under the Government's practice of the 
last 80 years, is not an express subsidy 
and that if countervailing duties were 
applied foreign governments would re-
taliate against the United States, result-
ing in massive trade disruption. 
"We are watching this case like milk 
on a h9t stove," an official of Europe's 
Common Market said. "An adverse rul-
ing could bring ~haos." 
Japanese officials see Zenith's posi-
tion and similar allegations by the 
l,Jnited States Steel Corporation as part 
of a protectionist ferment that threatens 
economic and political stability in the 
world. "It'~ a cloud over the multilat-
eral trade negotiations," warns Alonzo 
McDonald~ this country's deputy trade 
negotiator. 
To soften the blow of a ruling favora-
ble to Zenith's side, the Administration 
would have to seek special legislation 
from Congress, opening up a Pandora's 
box of trade controversy in an election 
year - a prospect that American offi-
cials view with apprehension. 
The precise point at Issue, argued 
orally April 25-26 in the ornate Supreme 
Court chamber, is whether the rebating 
of an indirect "commodity" tax on 
Japanese consumer electronic products 
exported to the United States is, in a 
legal sense, a "bounty or grant." These 
words, used in the Tariff Act of 1897, 
have never been defined. 
When people in Japan buy radio, tele-
vision or phonograph products, a 15 per-
cent consumption tax (something like a 
sales tax in the United States) is paid. 
But the 15 percent tax is not imposed on 
products made in Japan if they are 
shipped I)VerSeaS from the factory. And, 
if the tax is paid on a shipment intended 
for the domestic market, it is refunded 
by the Japanese Government should· the 
shipment be exported instead. 
Zenith maintains that the refund of 
the 15 percent tax is a bounty or grant. If the "ft\is<;hief" of the appellate court's on to American consumers, would mean 
it is, the Treasury is required by tariff decisioh. Otherwise, he asserted, there- these price increases: Japanese sport-
law to charge a 15 percent countervail- suit would be "judicial cooperation in ing equipment, 30 percent; Japanese 
ing duty on the goods when they enter the executive's refusal to honor the ex- cameras, 16 percent; French luxury 
the United States. ercise by Congres~ of its constitutional merchandise, 33.3 percent; French 
The company asked the Treasury to power and duty to regulate foreign com- wines, 17.6 percent; most goods from 
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soften the blow of a ruling favora-
ble to Zenith's side, the Administration 
would have to seek special legislation 
from Congress, opening up a Pandora's 
box of trade controversy in an election 
year - a prospect that American offi-
cials view with apprehension. 
The precise point at issue, argued 
orally April 25-26 in the ornate Supreme 
Court chamber, is whether the rebating 
of an indirect "commodity" tax on 
Japanese consumer electronic products 
exported to the United States is, in a 
legal sense, a "bounty or grant." These 
words, used in the Tariff Act of 1897, 
have never been defined. 
When people in Japan bu'y radio, tele-
vision or phonograph products, a 15 per-
cent consumption tax (something like a 
sales tax in the United States) is paid. 
But the 15 percent tax is not imposed on 
products made in Japan if they are 
shipped overseas from the factory. And, 
if the tax is paid on a shipment intended 
for the domestic market, It is refunded 
by the Japanese Government shouJd·the 
shipment be exported instead. 
Zenith maintains that the refund of 
the 15 percent tax is a bounty or grant. If 
it is, the Treasury is required by tariff 
Jaw to charge a 15 percent countervail-
ing duty on the goods when they enter 
the United States. . 
The company asked the Treasury to 
impose the levy in 1970. The Treasury 
refused, contending that Japan's tax 
forgiveness on exports is not legally a 
bounty or grant. Zenith appealed and 
won a unanimous ruling in its favor 
from a three-judge United States Cus-
toms Court on April12, 1977. The Treas-
ury appealed that ruling to the Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals, and last 
July, in a 3-to-2 judgment, it reversed 
the lower court. 
Though no countervailing duties were 
assessed, the Treasury has required 
that a 15 percent bond be posted on the 
Japanese-made consumer electronic 
goods in question. This is to cover the 
potential tariff liability on hundreds of 
millions of dollars of Japanese ship. 
ments if the final ruling vindicates Ze-
nith. The duties would be collected back 
to the date of the Customs Court deci-
sion. 
The next step in the case was Zenith's 
appeal to the Supreme Court, and in 
February it granted a writ of certiorari, 
signaling its willingness to review the 
case. All nine Justices were present at 
the oral arguments last month. 
Zenith's lawyer, Frederick L. Ikenson 
of the Washingtn Jaw firm of Stewart & 
Ikenson, asked the High Court to correct 
the "mischief" of the appellate court's 
deciston. Otherwise, he asserted, the re-
sult would be "judicial cooperation in 
the executive's refusal to honor the ex-
ercise by Congres~ of its constitutional 
power and duty to regulate foreign com-
merce." 
Solicitor General Wade H. McCree 
Jr., arguing for the Treasury, warned of 
the risks of a breakdown in international 
trade if the lower court's decision were 
reversed . 
In their questioning, the Justices 
showed an awareness of the wider 
issues. But there is no way to anticipate 
what their decision will be. Statistics 
offer little comfort to the Government: 
In two-thirds of the cases the Supreme 
Court has reviewed, it has reversed rul-
ings of the lower court . 
What gives the Zenith case far-reach-
ing significance is the fact that other 
large trading partners of the United 
States remit similar indirect taxes on 
goods they export. The Commerce De-
partment estimates that in 1976 the 
value of United States imports on which 
indirect taxes were exempted by the 
country of origin exceeded $50 billion-
which represents one-half of American 
imports. 
There would be a significant inflation-
ary, as well as trade, impact if the Su-
preme Court finds that export tax re-
mission is a bounty or grant. Official fig-
ures indicate that imposing countervail-
ing duties on all such imports, if passed 
on to American consumers, would mean 
these price increases: Japanese sport-
ing equipment, 30 percent; Japanese 
cameras, 16 percent; French luxury 
merchandise, 33.3 percent; French 
wines, 17.6 percent; most goods from 
West Germany, 11 percent; most goods 
from the Netherlands, 18 percent, and 
most goods from Canada, 12 percent. 
Solicitor General McCree likened the 
impact of added duties such as these to 
the impact of Smoot-Hawley in the 
1930's, when United States duties on im-
ported goods averaged 17 percent. The 
average duty now is 3.9 percent. 
If Zenith wins protection against for-
eign-made prooucts, other American 
manufacturers can be expected to fol-
gumem conunues;- tne t reasuryma~ 
swervingly taken the position, ratified 
repeatedly by Congress, that export tax 
rebates are not bounties or grants unless 
they are excessive. 
To change the rules now, when many 
nations have established systems of in-
direct taxation (such as the Common 
Market's value added tax) and when ex-
port tax rebates have been declared 
legal under the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade, would cause 
"significant economic disloactions here 
and abroad," the Treasury declares. 
"If there ever were a case,'' says the 
Government's brief, "in which the Court 
should defer to the (Treasury) Secre-
tary's interpretation of the statute he 
administers and leave to Congress the 
task of changing the governing rules, 
this is that case." 
Meanwhile, 'the United States has 
shown its concern over export tax re-
bates in the forums of economic diplo-
macy. A sign that the rebates could be-
come an explosive issue came as far 
back as 1968 in a Baiance of Payments 
address by President Lyndon B. John-
son. ''American commerce is at a disad-
vantage,'' he said, "because of the tax 
system of some of our trading partners. 
Some nations give across-the-board re-
bates on exports which leave their port 
and impose special border tax charges 
on our goods entering their country.' • 
Robert S. Strauss, this country's Spe-
cial Representative for Trade Negotia-
tions, is pressing for tough standards 
governing rebates and subsidies at the 
multilateral trade negotiations being 
held in Geneva. But the prospects of 
winning significant concessions are un-
certain. 
Clyde H. Farnsworth is a reporter in 
the- Washington bureau of The New York 
Times. 
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MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. &) 
Under § 303(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, 46 Stat~~. 
amended, 19 u.s.c. § 1303(a) (Supp. V, 1975), wheneve~ ~ 
foreign country pays a "bounty or grant" upon the e~ rtJ._ 
of a product from that country, the Secretary of ~ ~~ 
J - .1 - -- - L j_ \,' 
is required to levy a countervailing duty, "equal t~ 1 
amount of such bounty or grant," upon 
product into the United States.l The 
whether Japan confers a "bounty" or "grant" on cert · 
electronic products by failing to impose a commodity~n~ 
~ &f<. 
those products when they are exported, while imposing the tax 
on the products when they are sold in Japan. 
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I 
Under the Commodity Tax Law of Japan, Law No. 48 of 1962, 
see App. 44-48, a variety of consumer goods, including the 
electronic products at issue here, are subject to an "indirect" 
tax -- a tax levied on the goods themselves, and computed as a 
percentage of the manufacturer's sales price rather than the 
income or wealth of the purchaser or seller. The Japanese tax 
applies both to products manufactured in Japan and to those 
imported into Japan.2 On goods manufactured in Japan, the 
tax is levied upon shipment from the factory; imported products 
are taxed when they are withdrawn from the customs warehouse. 
Only goods destined for consumption in Japan are subject to the 
tax, however. Products shipped for export are exempt, and any 
tax paid upon the shipment of a product is refunded if the 
product is subsequently exported. Thus the tax is "remitted" 
on exports.3 
In April 1970 petitioner, an American manufacturer of 
consumer electronic products, filed a petition with the 
. Commissioner of Customs,4 requesting assessment of 
countervailing duties on a number of consumer electronic 
products exported from Japan to this country.5 Petitioner 
alleged that Japan had bestowed a "bounty or grant" upon 
exportation of these products by, inter alia, remitting the 
Japanese Commodity Tax that would have been imposed had the 
products been sold within Japan. In January 1976, after 
soliciting the views of interested parties and conducting an 
investigation pursuant to Treasury Department regulations, see 
19 C.F.R. § 159.47(c) (1977), the Acting Commissioner of 
Customs published a notice of final determination, rejecting 
petitioner's request. 41 Fed. Reg. 1298 (1976) .6 
Petitioner then filed suit in the Customs Court, claiming 
that the Treasury Department had erred in concluding that 
remission of the Japanese Commodity Tax was not a bounty or 
grant within the purview of the countervailing duty 
statute.? The Department defended on the ground that, since 
the remission of indirect taxes was "no~excessive," the statute 
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did not require assessment of a countervailing duty. In the 
Department's terminology, a remission of taxes is 
"nonexcessive'' if it does not exceed the amount of tax paid or 
otherwise due; thus, for example, if a tax of $5 is levied on 
goods at the factory, the return of the $5 upon exportation 
would be "nonexcessive," whereas a payment of $8 from the 
government to the manufacturer upon exportation would be 
"excessive" by $3. The Department pointed out that the current 
version of § 303 is in all relevant respects unchanged from the 
countervailing duty statute enacted by Congress in 1897,8 and 
that the Secretary -- in decisions dating back to 1898 -- has 
always taken the position that the nonexcessive remission of an 
indirect tax is not a bounty or grant within the meaning of the 
statute.9 
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the Customs Court 
ruled in favor of petitioner and ordered the Secretary to 
assess countervailing duties on all Japanese consumer 
electronic products specified in petitioner's complaint. 430 
F. Supp. 242 (1977). The court acknowledged the Secretary's 
longstanding interpretation of the statute. It concluded, 
however, that this administrative practice could not be 
sustained in light of this Court's decision in Downs v. United 
States, 187 u.s. 496 {1903), which held that an export bounty 
had been conferred by a complicated Russian scheme for the 
regulation of sugar production and sale, involving, among other 
elements, remission of excise taxes in the event of exportation. 
On appeal by the Government, the Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals, dividing 3-2, reversed the judgment of the 
Customs Court and remanded for entry of summary judgment in 
favor of the United States. 562 F.2d 1209 (1977). The 
majority opinion distinguished Downs on the ground that it did 
not decide the question of whether nonexcessive remission of an 
indirect tax, standing alone, constitutes a bounty or grant 
upon exportation. The court then examined the language of § 
303 and the legislative history of the 1897 provision and 
concluded that, "in determining whether a bounty or grant has 
been conferred, it is the economic result of the foreign 
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government's action which controls." 562 F.2d at 1216. 
Relying primarily on the "long-continued" and "uniform" 
administrative practice, id. at 1218-1219, 1222-1223, and 
secondarily on congressional "acquiescence'' in this practice 
through repeated re-enactment of the controlling statutory 
language, id. at 1220, the court held that interpretation of 
"bounty or grant" so as not to include a nonexcessive remission 
of an indirect tax is "a lawfully p~rmissible interpretation of 
§ 303." 562 F.2d at 1223. 
We granted certiorari, u.s. {1978) , and we now 
affirm. 
II 
It is undisputed that the Treasury Department adopted the 
statutory interpretation at issue here less than a year after 
passage of the basic countervailing duty statute in 1897, see 
T.D. 19321, 1 Synopsis of [Treasury] Decisions 696 {1898), ·and 
that the Department has uniformly maintained this position for 
over 80 years.lO This longstanding and consistent 
~dministrative interpretation is entitled to considerable 
weight. 
"When faced with a problem of statutory construction, this 
Court shows great deference to the interpretation given the 
statute by the officers or agency charged with its 
administration. 'To sustain [an agency's] application of 
[a] statutory term, we need not find that its construction 
is the only reasonable one, or even that it is the result 
we would have reached had the question arisen in the first 
instance in judicial proceedings.'" Udall v. Tallman, . 380 
u.s. 1, 16 (1965}, quoting Unemployment Compensation 
Commission v. Aragon, 329 u.s. 143, 153 (1946}. 
Moreover, an administrative "practice has peculiar weight when 
it involves a contemporaneous construction of a statute by the 
[persons] charged with the responsibility of setting its 
machinery in motion, of making the parts work efficiently and 
smoothly while they are yet untried and new." Norwegian 
Nitrogen Products Co . . v. United States, 288 u.s. 294, 315 
(1933}; see,~, Power Reactor Co. v. Electricians, 367 u.s. 
396, 408 (1961}. 
The question is thus whether, in light of the normal aids 
to statutory construction, the Department's interpretation is 
"sufficiently reasonable" to be accepted by a reviewing court. 
Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 75 
(1975}. Our examination of the language, the legislative 
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history, and the overall purpose of the ' 1897 provision 
persuades us that the Department's initial construction of the 
statute was far from unreasonable; and we are unable to find 
anything in the events subsequent to that time that convinces 
us that the Department was required to abandon this 
interpretation. 
A 
The language of the 1897 statute evolved out of two earlier 
countervailing duty provisions that had been applicable only to· 
sugar imports. The first provision was enacted in 1890, 
apparently for the purpose of protecting domestic · sugar 
refiners from unfair foreign competition; it provided for a 
fixed countervailing duty on refined sugar imported from 
countries that "pay •.. , directly or indirectly, a [greater] 
bounty on the exportation of" refined sugar than on raw sugar. 
Tariff Act of 1890, ' 237, 26 Stat. 584. Although the 
congressional debates did not focus sharply on the meaning of 
the word "bounty," what evidence there is suggests that the 
term was not intended to encompass the nonexcessive remission 
of an indirect tax. Thus, one strong supporter of increased 
protection for American sugar producers heavily criticized the 
export "bounties" conferred by several European governments, 
and attached a concise description of "The Bounty Systems in 
Europe"; both the remarks and the description indicated that 
the "bounties" consisted of the amounts by which government 
payments exceeded the excise taxes that had been paid upon the 
beets from which the sugar was produced. See 21 Cong. Rec. 
9529, 9532 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Gibson); id. at 9537 
(description). According to the description, for example, 
French sugar manufacturers paid an "excise tax [of] $97.06 per 
gross ton [,] [b]ut upon the export of a ton of sugar 
received back as a drawback $117.60, making a clear bounty of 
$20~54 per gross ton of sugar exported." Id. at 9537. 
This concept of a "net" bounty that is, a remission in 
excess of taxes paid or otherwise due -- as the trigger for a 
countervailing duty requirement emerged more clearly in the 
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second sugar provision, enacted in 1894; Tariff Act of 1894, t 
182 1/2, 28 Stat. 521. The 1894 statute extended the 
countervailing duty requirement to all imported sugar, raw as 
well as refined, and provided for payment of a fixed duty on 
all sugar coming from a country which "pays, directly or 
indirectly, a bounty on the export thereof." A proviso to the 
statute made clear, however, that no duties were to be assessed 
in the event that the "bounty" did not exceed the amount of 
taxes already paid.ll The author of the 1894 provision, 
Senator Jones, expressly characterized this difference between 
the amounts received upon exportation and the amounts already 
paid in taxes as the "net bounty" on exportation. 26 Cong. 
Rec. 5705 (1894) (discussing German export bounty system). 
The 1897 statute greatly expanded upon the coverage of the 
1894 provision by making the countervailing duty requirement 
applicable to all imported products. Tariff Act of 1897, § 5, 
30 Stat. 205, quoted in n. 8, supra. There are strong 
indications, however, that Congress intended to retain the "net 
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bounty" concept of the 1894 provision as the criterion for 
determining when a countervailing duty was to be imposed. 
Although the proviso in the 1894 law was deleted, the 1897 
statute did provide for levying of duties equal to the "net 
amount" of any export bounty or grant. And the legislative 
history suggests that this language, in addition to 
establishing a responsive mechanism for determining the 
appropriate amount of countervailing duty, was intended to 
incorporate the prior rule that nonexcessive remission of 
indirect taxes would not trigger the countervailing requirement 
at all. 
There is no question that the prior rule was carried 
forward in the version of the 1897 statute that originally 
passed the House. This version did not extend the 
countervailing duty requirement to all imports. Instead, it 
merely modified the 1894 sugar provision so that the amount of 
the countervailing duty, rather than being fixed, would be 
"equal to [the export] bounty, or so much thereof as may be in 
excess of any tax collected by [the foreign] country upon [the] 
exported [sugar], or upon the beet or cane from which it was 
produced " See 30 Cong. Rec. 1634 (1897). The House 
Report unequivocally stated that the countervailing duty was 
intended to be "equivalent to the net export bounty paid by any 
country." H.R. Rep. No. 1, 55th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1897) 
(emphasis supplied)~ 
The Senate deleted the House provision from the bill and 
replaced it with the more general provision that was eventually 
enacted into law. See 30 Cong. Rec. at 1733 (striking House 
provision); id. at 2226 (adopting general provision); id. at 
2705, 2750 (House agreement to Senate amendment). The debates 
in the Senate indicate, however, that -- aside from extending 
the coverage of the House provision -- the Senate did not 
intend to change its substance. Senator Allison, the sponsor 
of the Senate amendment, explained that the House provision was 
being "stricken from the bill," because "the same paragraph in 
substance [is] being inserted [in] section [5], making this 
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countervailing duty apply to all articles instead of to [sugar] 
alone." Id. at 1635. See also id. at 1732 (remarks of Sen. 
White) • Senator Allison twice remarked that the countervailing 
duty that he was proposing was an "imitation" of the one 
provided in the 1894 statute, id. at 1719; see id. at 1674, and 
later in the debates he stated -- in response to a question as 
to whether the countervailing duty would be equal to "the whole 
amount of the export bounty" that "[the bounty contemplated] 
is the net bounty, less the taxes and reductions ... ," id. 
at 1721 (answering question by Sen. Vest). 
: . 
An additional indication of the Senate's intent can be 
found in the extended discussion of the effect that the statute 
would have with respect to German sugar exports. Time after 
time the amount of the German "bounty" -- and, correspondingly, 
the amount of the countervailing duty that would be imposed 
under the statute -- was stated to be 38¢ per 100 pounds of 
refined sugar, and 27¢ per 100 pounds of raw sugar. See, e.g., 
id. at 1650 (remarks of Sens. Allison, Vest, and Caffery), 1658 
. -·-- ..... .. .... .. r-
(Sens. Allison and Jones), 1680 (Sen. Jones), 1719 (Sens. 
Allison and Lindsay), 1729 (Sen. Caffery), 2823-2824 (Sens. 
Aldrich and Jones). These figures were supplied by the 
Treasury Department itself, see id. at 1719 (remarks of Sen. 
Allison), 1722 (letter from Treasury Department to Sen. 
Caffery) , and were utilized by both proponents and opponents of 
the measure. And yet it was frequently acknowledged during the 
debates that Germany exempted sugar exports from its domestic 
consumption tax of $2.16 per 100 pounds, an amount far in 
excess of the 38¢ and 27¢ figures. See, ~' id. at 1646 
(remarks of Sen. Vest), 1651 (Sen. Caffery), 1697 (same), 2205 
(same). Had the Senators considered the mere remission of an 
indirect tax to be a "bounty," it seems unlikely that they 
would have stated that the German "bounties" were only 38¢ and 
27¢ per 100 pounds.l2 Especially in light of the strong 
opposition to countervailing duties even of the magnitude of 
38¢ and 27¢, see,~' id. at 1719 (remarks of Sen. Lindsay), 
2203-2205 (remarks of Sen. Gray), it seems reasonable to infer 
that Congress did not intend to impose countervailing duties of 
many times this magnitude. 
B 
Regardless of whether this legislative history absolutely 
compelled the Secretary to interpret "bounty or grant" so as 
not to encompass any nonexcessive remission of an indirect tax, 
there can be no doubt that such a construction was reasonable 
in light of the statutory purpose. Cf. Mourning v. Family 
Publications Service, Inc., 411 u.s. 356, 374 (1973). This 
purpose is relatively clear from the face of the statute and is 
confirmed by the congressional debates: the countervailing 
duty was intended to offset the unfair competitive advantage 
that foreign producers would otherwise enjoy from export 
subsidies paid by their governments. See, ~, 30 Cong. Rec. 
at 1674 {remarks of Sen. Allison), 2205 (Sen. Caffery), 2225 
(Sen. Lindsay). The Treasury Department was well-positioned to 
establish rules of decision that would accurately carry out 
this purpose, particularly since it had contributed the very 
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figures relied upon by Congress in enacting the statute. See 
Zuber v. Allen, 396 u.s. 168, 192 (1969}. 
In deciding in 1898 that a nonexcessive remission of 
indirect taxes did not result in the type of competitive 
advantage that Congress intended to counteract, the Department 
was clearly acting in accordance with the shared assumptions of 
the day as to the fairness and economic effect of that 
practice. The theory underlying the Department's position was 
that a foreign country's remission of indirect taxes did not 
constitute subsidization of that country's exports. Rather, 
such remission was viewed as a reasonable measure for avoiding 
double taxation of exports -- once by the foreign country and 
once upon sale in this country. As explained in a recent study 
prepared by the Department for the Senate Committee on Finance, 
"[the Department's construction was] based on the principle 
that, since exports are not consumed in the country of 
production, they should not be subject to consumption taxes 
in that country. The theory has been that the application 
of countervailing duties to the rebate of consumption [and 
other indirect] taxes would have the effect of double 
taxation of the product, since the United States would not 
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only impose its own indirect taxes, such as Federal ana 
state excise taxes ana state ana local sales taxes, but 
would also collect, through the use of the countervailing 
duty, the indirect tax imposed by the exporting country on 
domestically consumed goods." Executive Branch GATT 
Studies, Senate Comm. on Finance, 93o Cong., 2a Sess. 17-18 
(1974). 
This intuitively appealing principle regarding double taxation 
had been widely accepted both in this country ana abroad for 
many years prior to enactment of the 1897 statute. See, ~, 
Act of July 4, 1789, § 3, 1 Stat. 26 (remission of import 
duties upon exportation of products); 4 D. Ricardo, _ works ana 
Correspondence 216-217 (P. Sraffa eo. 1951) (first published in 
1822); A. Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations, Book Four, ch. IV (1776). 
c 
The Secretary's interpretation of the countervailing duty 
statute is as permissible today as it was in 1898. The statute 
has been re-enacted five times by Congress without any 
modification of the relevant language, see n. 8 supra, ana, 
whether or not Congress can be said to have "acquiesced" in the 
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administrative practice, it certainly has not acted to change 
it. At the same time, the Secretary's position has been 
incorporated into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT),l3 which is followed by every major trading nation in 
the world; foreign tax systems as well as private expectations 
thus have been built on the assumption that countervailing 
duties would not be imposed on nonexcessive remissions of 
indirect taxes. In light of these substantial reliance 
interests, the longstanding administrative construction of the 
statute should ''not be disturbed except for cogent reasons." 
McLaren v. Fleischer, 256 U.S. 477, 481 (1921); see Udall v. 
Tallman, supra, 380 u.s. at 18. 
Aside from the contention, discussed in Part III, infra, 
that the Department's construction is inconsistent with this 
Court's decisions, petitioner's sole argument is that the 
Department's position is premised on false economic assumptions 
that should be rejected by the courts. In particular, 
petitioner points to "modern" economic theory suggesting that 
remission of indirect taxes may create an incentive to export 
in some circumstances, and to recent criticism of the GATT 
rules as favoring producers in countries that rely more heavily 
on indirect than on direct taxes.l4 But, even assuming that 
these arguments are at all relevant in view of the legislative 
history of the 1897 provision and the longstanding 
administrative construction of the statute, they do not 
demonstrate the unreasonableness of the Secretary's current 
positio~. Even "modern" economists do not agree on the 
ultimate economic effect of remitting indirect taxes, and --
given the present state of economic knowledge -- it may be 
difficult, if not impossible, to measure the precise effect in 
any particular case. See, ~, Executive Branch GATT Studies, 
supra, at 13-14, 17; Marks & Malmgren, supra n. 14, at 351. 
More fundamentally, as the Senate Committee with responsibility 
in this area recently stated, "the issues involved in applying 
the countervailing duty law are complex, and .•. 
internationally, there is [a] lack of any satisfactory 
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agreement on what constitutes a fair, as opposed to an 
'unfair,' subsidy." S. Rep. No. 93-1298, p. 183 (1974). In 
this situation, it is not the task of the judiciary to 
substitute its views as to fairness and economic effect for 
those of the Secretary. 
III 
Notwithstanding all of the foregoing considerations, this 
would be a very different case if, as petitioner contends, the 
Secretary's practice were contrary to this Court's decision in 
Downs v. United States, supra, 187 u.s. 496.15 Upon close 
examination of the admittedly opaque opinion in that case, 
however, we do not believe that Downs is controlling on the 
issue presented here. 
The Russian sugar laws at issue in Downs were, as the Court 
noted, "very complicated." Id. at 502. Much of the Court's 
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opinion was devoted to an exposition of these provisions, see 
id. at 502-512, but for present purposes only two features are 
relevant: (1) excise taxes imposed on sugar sales within 
Russia were remitted on exports; and {2) the exporter received, 
in addition, a certificate entitling its bearer to sell an 
amount of sugar in Russia, equal to the quantity exported, 
without paying the full excise tax otherwise due. This 
certificate was transferable and had a substantial market value 
related to the amount of tax forgiveness that it carried with 
it. 
The Secretary, following the same interpretation of the 
statute that he followed here, imposed a countervailing duty 
based on the value of the certificates alone, and not on the 
excise taxes remitted on the export~ themselves.l6 Downs, 
the importer, sought review claiming that the Russian system 
did not confer any countervailable bounty or grant within the 
meaning of the 1897 statute. He did not otherwise challenge 
the amount of the duty assessed by the Secretary.l7 
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The issue as it came before this Court, therefore, was 
whether a nonexcessive remission of an indirect tax, together 
with the granting of an additional benefit represented by the 
value of the certificate, constituted a "bounty or grant." 
Since the amount of the bounty was not in question, neither the 
parties nor this Court focused carefully on the distinction 
between remission of the excise tax and conferral of the 
certificate. Petitioner argues, however, that certain broad 
language in the Court's opinion suggests that mere remission of 
a tax, even if nonexcessive, must be considered a bounty or 
grant within the meaning of the statute. Petitioner relies in 
particular on the following language: 
"The details of this elaborate procedure for the 
production, sale, taxation and exportation of Russian sugar 
are of much less importance than the two facts which appear 
clearly through this maze of regulations, viz.: that no 
sugar is permitted to be sold in Russia that does not pay 
an excise tax of R. 1.75 per pood, and that sugar exported 
pays no tax at all ...• When a tax is imposed upon all 
sugar produced, but is remitted upon all sugar exported, 
then, by whatever process, or in whatever manner, or under 
whatever name it is disguised, it is a bounty upon 
exportation." Id. at 515. 
This passage is inconsistent with both preceding and 
subsequent language which suggests that the Court understood 
the "bounty" to reside in the value of the certificates. At 
one point the Court stated that "[t]he amount [the exporter] 
receives for his export certificate [on the market], say, R. 
1.25, is the exact amount of the bounty he receives upon 
exportation . • . " 187 u.s. at 515.18 And the Court in 
conclusion specifically endorsed the Fourth Circuit's holding 
to the same effect, see n. 17 supra: 
"[T]he Circuit Court of Appeals found: 'That the Russian 
exporter of sugar obtained from his government a 
certificate, solely because of such exportation, which is 
worth in the open market of that country from R. 1.25 to R. 
1.64 per pood, or from 1.8 to 2.35 cents per pound. 
Therefore we hold that the government of Russia does secure 
to the exporter of that country, as the inevitable result 
of its action, a money reward or gratuity whenever he 
exports sugar from Russia.' We all concur in this 
expression of opinion." 187 U.S. at 516. 
Given this other language, we cannot read for its broadest 
implications the passage on which petitioner relies. In our 
view the passage does no more than establish the proposition 
that an excessive remission of taxes -- there, the combination 
of the exemption with the certificates is an export bounty 
within the meaning of the statute. 
As the court below noted, "' [i]t is a maxim, not to be 
disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are to 
be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions 
are used.'" 562 F.2d at 1213, quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 6 
Wheat. 264, 398 {1821). No one argued in Downs that a 
nonexcessive remission of taxes, standing alone, would have 
constituted a bounty on exportation, and indeed that issue was 
not presented on the facts of the case. It must also be 
remembered, of course, that the Court did affirm the 
Secretary's decision, and that decision rested on the 
conclusion that a bounty had been paid only to the extent that 
I 
the remission exceeded the taxes otherwise due. In light of 
all these circumstances, the isolated statement in Downs relied 
upon by petitioner cannot be dispositive here. 
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TO: LFP, Jr. 
FROM: Bob 
RE: Mr. Justice Marshall's Draft in Zenith Radio v. U.S. 
I think that this is a first-rate opinion right up 
until 20, where the discussion of the Downs case begins. 
At that point, a fupge begins, since a close of analysis 
of Downs would seem to indicate that the holding of the 
case precludes the result Justice Marshall has to reach. 
Still, Downs is extremely opaque, and this reading is not 
completely unfair. 
If you are willing to swallow this rather facile 
treatment of a less-than-crystal-clear precedent, you 
could join. Otherwise, you could dissent along the 
following lines: 
Although the Court's discussion of the 
legislative history of the Tariff Act and the administrative 
practice thereunder is most persuasive, I am constrained 
to dissent. In my view, a close reading of Downs v. 
United States, 187 U.S. 496 (1903), precludes us from 
reaching the result reached by the Court today, the 
long administrative practice notwithstanding. 
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you have written a persuasive 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
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Please join me. I, like Lewis, continue to have some 
difficulty with Downs. I also was somewhat disturbed by the 
long administrative delay here and by the Japanese communica-
tion distributed shortly before the oral argument. 
Your addition to footnote 9 is most helpful. 
Sincerely, 
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